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Peter L. Cooch*

California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.:
Mismanaging the Intersection of Antitrust and
Labor Law

Introduction
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered whether the nonstatutory
labor exemption insulated a multiemployer bargaining unit’s temporary revenue
sharing provision from antitrust scrutiny, and if not, which Sherman Act § 1
standard of review applied.2 The court held that summary condemnation, whether
as a per se violation or on a “quick look” analysis, was improper because the rule of
reason standard of review governed the inquiry.3 By continuing the federal courts’
preference for avoiding false positives over formalistic line drawing, the court
properly linked antitrust challenges of intricate collective bargaining arrangements
to the rule of reason.4 Applying the rule of reason standard allows courts to
sufficiently analyze the complex economics of temporary revenue sharing
provisions and avoid condemnation of beneficial business practices.5
Despite its liberal application of the rule of reason standard, the court
inappropriately declined to broaden the scope of antitrust law’s nonstatutory labor
exemption.6 As a result of the court’s narrow interpretation, multiemployer
bargaining units face unnecessary antitrust liability exposure when using revenue
sharing provisions during collective bargaining.7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit created an
imbalance of bargaining power between employer and union, increasing the costs
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1. 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 1122.
3. Id. at 1134, 1137.
4. See infra Part IV.A
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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of labor negotiations and undermining fair collective bargaining.8 Alternatively,
applying the nonstatutory labor exemption to temporary revenue sharing
provisions would further antitrust and labor policy by avoiding false positives,
reducing litigation costs, and encouraging mutually beneficial negotiations.9

I. The Case
A. Factual Background
With their current collective bargaining agreement expiring in October of 2003,
three of Southern California’s largest supermarket chains, Ralphs, Albertson’s and
Vons, formed a multiemployer collective bargaining unit (MEBU)10 to negotiate a
new labor contract (CBA) with the United Food and Commercial Workers labor
organization (UCFW).11 A month before the old labor contract expired, the grocers
executed two Mutual Strike Assistant Agreements (collectively the “Agreement”)12
to prepare for the upcoming negotiations.13 The employers, in anticipation of union
whipsaw tactics,14 agreed to abide by a revenue sharing provision (RSP) and lock
out all union employees within forty-eight hours of a strike.15 In addition, the RSP
included Food 4 Less, a supermarket not privy to the disputed contract.16 Food 4
Less agreed to the RSP because its own labor agreement would expire in the near

8.
9.
10.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
Multiemployer bargaining units form when several employers in one industry join together to
collectively negotiate with a union. Comment, Employer Withdrawal from Multiemployer Bargaining Units: A
Proposal for Self-Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 689 (1982). Typically, both employers and unions favor the
use of multiemployer bargaining units to facilitate efficient negotiations. Id. Once the National Labor Relations
Board, a federal regulatory agency, certifies a multiemployer bargaining unit with each party’s consent,
employer and union can begin negotiations. Id. at 690.
11. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Safeway, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part by Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Cal.
ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). As one of the nation’s largest labor
unions, the UFCW represents over 1.3 million workers in retail food and clothing industries, meatpacking,
poultry and other food processing industries, and health care, garment, chemical and distillery industries. Brief
of Amici Curiae United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 1, Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway,
Inc., 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2011) (Filed No. 08-55671, No. 08-55708), 2009 WL 2824441, at *1.
12. The two agreements were identical in substance, except each applied to a different labor organization.
Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 & n.1.
13. Id. at 1182.
14. Whipsaw tactics are stratagems designed to act as economic weapons by exerting pressure on one
employer within a multiemployer bargaining unit. In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the union
employed selective strikes and picketing during the lockout. 651 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
15. Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
16. Id.
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future.17 With negotiations upcoming, Food 4 Less had a strong interest in the
current dispute’s outcome.18
By agreeing to the RSP, the individual grocers were hedged against lost revenues
from any targeted whipsaw tactic; if the union picketed a particular grocer, reducing
that grocer’s revenues, the harmed party would have received compensation from
the other benefiting grocers.19 The RSP employed a fixed formula of limited
duration to calculate shared revenues.20 Essentially, the agreement required any
member earning revenues above its historical market share to reimburse fifteen
percent of excess revenues to the whipsaw victims.21 The RSP applied to revenues
accrued from the week in which the strike commenced until two full weeks
following the end of the strike.22
On October 11, 2003, negotiations broke down and the UCFW went on strike,
picketing select supermarkets.23 The impasse lasted over four months, ending in
February 2004.24 As required by the RSP, Ralphs and Food 4 Less paid the other
supermarkets approximately $142 million in excess revenue acquired during the
strike period and another $4.2 million for the two-week period following the
strike.25
B. Procedural History
On February 2, 2004, the State of California filed a complaint alleging that the
MEBU members violated U.S. antitrust law, specifically Sherman Act § 1, by
engaging in an unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade
and commerce.26 The grocers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
RSP was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the nonstatutory labor exemption.27
The district court denied the motion, holding that the RSP was beyond the scope of
the nonstatutory labor exemption.28 In addition, the district court denied
California’s motion for summary judgment in which California argued that the RSP

17.
18.
19.
20.

Harris, 651 F.3d at 1142.
Id.
Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
Id. (“[B]eginning at ‘12:01 a.m. on the Monday at the start of the week in which the strike or
lockout . . . commences and continuing for two . . . full weeks following the week in which each strike or
lockout ends.’”).
21. Id. at 1197.
22. Id. at 1182.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1181. California sought a permanent injunction and attorney’s fees. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway,
Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011).
27. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124.
28. Id.
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was a per se violation of § 1 or, alternatively, that it was unlawful under the “quick
look” analysis.29
While preserving the right to appeal, the parties stipulated to the entry of final
judgment for the grocers after California agreed not to pursue liability for a
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act under a full rule of reason analysis, and the
defendants agreed not to pursue various affirmative defenses except the
nonstatutory labor exemption.30 In accordance with the parties’ stipulations, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the grocers.31
California appealed, arguing that the RSP was per se unlawful under § 1 or,
alternatively, under “quick look” analysis.32 In addition, the MEBU cross-appealed,
arguing that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied.33 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that the RSP violated the Sherman Act under a “quick look” analysis
and the defendants’ actions were not exempt under the nonstatutory labor
exemption.34 Pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3, a majority of the judges voted to rehear
the case en banc.35

II. Legal Background
By the late nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution had brought about
significant social and economic changes to the United States.36 Cooperation and
aggregation among large firms threatened to hinder robust economic competition.37
Thus, in 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) to

29. The defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment on the nonstatutory labor exemption,
which was denied a second time. Id.
30. Id. Although unclear in the opinion, the State of California was most likely unwilling to pursue the case
under the rule of reason standard due to the extensive resources necessary to fully litigate a case under this
standard. See Jennifer E. Gladieux, Towards a Single Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade Commission’s
Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1997) (“[A]pplying [the rule of reason] can be
difficult because significant judicial costs are entailed in undertaking a complete factual inquiry, including the
costs of gathering evidence on varied industries, performing a market analysis, and interpreting business
rationales.”); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J.
1001 (1986) (examining the effect of increased litigation expenses and declining government enforcement on
private antitrust litigation).
31. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by
Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
35. Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 633 F.3d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011).
36. See Myron W. Watkins, The Sherman Act: Its Designs and Its Effects, 43 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1–3 (1928) (“[T]o
realize that the last generation was the first to learn to look upon affairs from this national viewpoint
habitually . . . but reflected the change in the scope of economic intercourse from local and sectional markets to
national markets . . . By the Act of July 2, 1890, called the Sherman Act, Congress for the first time exerted its
paramount authority so as to make every species of business conducted in the national sphere subject to a
common rule. The subject matter of that common rule was the method of organizing trade and industry.”).
37. Id.
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combat the harmful effects of excessive industrial concentration and promote
competition.38 Sherman Act § 1 prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . .”39 Since
the language of § 1 is largely ambiguous, judicial interpretation has guided the law’s
development.40 Over the past century, federal courts have developed three different
methods for scrutinizing business practices challenged under Sherman Act § 1.41 An
antitrust court will apply a different standard of review depending on the
challenged practice’s nature.42 To facilitate healthy labor relations, however,
Congress and the Supreme Court have insulated certain aspects of collective
bargaining from antitrust scrutiny.43
A. The Analytical Framework for Resolving Sherman Act § 1 Disputes
Read strictly, courts could interpret § 1 to ban literally every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade.44 To some degree every contract or business
combination creates cooperation between potential rivals.45 However, many of these
business arrangements enhance competition.46 Efficient commodities trading, for
example, would not be possible without comprehensive rules regulating traders.47
These procompetitive practices operate to increase output and reduce price,
improving economic conditions for consumers.48 The goal of antitrust law,
therefore, has not been to eliminate all business associations, but “to perfect the
operation of competitive markets.”49

38.
39.
40.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (noting that the Sherman Act’s legislative history makes it clear that the
courts have a broad mandate to shape the law by relying on the common-law tradition); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) (noting that “[i]n antitrust, the federal courts enjoy
more flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute”).
41. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK, §§ 2:9, 10 (2012).
42. Federal courts have struggled to find the appropriate boundaries for these standards. See infra Parts
II.A.1–3.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting
that the NCAA’s television contract constitutes a “restraint of trade” because it limits members’ freedom to
negotiate, but stressing that every contract, in some sense, is a restraint of trade).
45. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
46. Id.
47. See id. (noting that the Chicago Board of Trade has “a sheaf of rules and cooperative arrangements that
reduce the cost of competition”).
48. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 113 (noting that as Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), indicates, a joint selling arrangement may “mak[e]
possible a new product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty.
Med. Soc’y, 467 U.S. 332, 365 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted))).
49. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 1.
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Through the Sherman Act, Congress intended to protect consumers from
anticompetitive business practices that suppress competition and reduce economic
wealth.50 Since some arrangements are procompetitive, the Supreme Court has held
that the Sherman Act only condemns unreasonable restraints of trade.51 By
eliminating only unreasonable restraints, the Court encourages the efficient
allocation of resources such that “consumers are assured competitive price and
quality.”52 Given the complexities of modern markets, courts are hard pressed to
effectuate this policy and find the appropriate balance between competition and
cooperation.53
Antitrust judges face two potential errors during the decision-making process.54
A false positive occurs when the judge mistakenly condemns a procompetitive
practice.55 Conversely, a false negative manifests when a judge errantly permits a
competition-harming business practice.56 The Supreme Court and commentators
have noted that false positives are particularly concerning because the practice’s
benefits may be lost forever.57 Stare decisis discourages firms from engaging in the
condemned practice for fear of antitrust liability.58 False negatives, by contrast, are
self-correcting in the long run.59 Anticompetitive practices attract new market entry
because prices and output are not at equilibrium levels.60 To address these concerns
and assess antitrust challenges efficiently, courts have developed three different
standards of review: the per se rule, the rule of reason, and the “quick look” or
truncated rule of reason.61

50. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978))).
51. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
52. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
53. See Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2 (noting that courts cannot confidently determine an antitrust suit
unless it knows the ‘right’ balance between competition and cooperation).
54. See id. (examining the harm from condemning procompetitive restraints and permitting
anticompetitive practices).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Chris Bernard, Shifting and Shrinking Common Ground: Recalibrating the Federal Trade
Commission’s and Department of Justice’s Enforcement Powers of Single-Firm Monopoly Conduct, 34 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 581, 591 (2009) (noting that “[i]n the past, the Court has stressed the need to reduce ‘false positives’ because
‘mistaken inferences . . . chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect’” (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2.
58. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The separate categories reflect an attempt by the federal judiciary to limit the costs associated with
expensive litigation. Gladieux, supra note 30, at 472.
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1. The Per Se Rule
When a court finds a business practice plainly anticompetitive and without
redeeming procompetitive virtues, the practice is condemned as per se unlawful.62 If
a plaintiff can prove that the defendant engaged in the condemned action, the court
will impose liability “without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.”63 Once the plaintiff makes his prima
facie case, the defendant is precluded from proving that the restraint is reasonable.64
Business practices receive per se classification only after courts are sufficiently
familiar with the particular class of restraint to predict with confidence that full
analysis will condemn it.65
The per se rule is inappropriate where the challenged practice’s economic impact
is not immediately obvious.66 The Supreme Court has used Chicago School
economic models to analyze business practices and replace per se rules with the rule
of reason.67 Over time, the Court has altered its interpretation of the rule’s scope to
reflect modern economic thinking.68 In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.,69 the Supreme Court previously held unlawful a manufacturer’s policy to sell its
products only to distributers agreeing to resell them at predetermined prices.70 For
nearly a century, the Court interpreted Dr. Miles to impose the per se rule on
agreements between a manufacturer and retailer that set a minimum price for the
resale of the manufacturer’s goods, known as vertical71 resale price maintenance.72
However, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS,73 the Supreme Court’s new
interpretation overturned Dr. Miles, holding that the per se rule does not apply to
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

N. Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Id.
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9.
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 475 U.S. 322, 344 (1982).
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (quoting FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S.
477, 458–59 (1986)) (quotation marks omitted).
67. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 620–21 (2005). For a discussion of the economic price theory underpinning the
Sherman Act, see PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID, & WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, APP. (6th ed.
2010).
68. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (rejecting application
of the per se rule to vertical minimum resale price maintenance based on economics literature providing
procompetitive justifications for the practice).
69. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
70. Id. at 408.
71. Among other factors, federal courts differentiate business practices based on the relationship between
firms in the channels of distribution. See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 730 (1998) (explaining the difference between horizontal and vertical restraints of trade). A horizontal
restraint occurs between two firms competing at the same level of commerce, i.e. manufacturer-tomanufacturer or retail-to-retail agreements. Id. A vertical restraint affects firms at different levels of the
distribution stream, i.e. manufacturer-to-distributor relationships. Id.
72. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).
73. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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vertical minimum resale price maintenance.74 The retailer PSKS sued after a leather
goods and accessories manufacturer, Leegin Leather Products, ceased selling brand
name products to the plaintiff because the retailer refused to follow Leegin’s
minimum pricing policies.75 Relying on expert economic analysis, the Court
acknowledged that the pricing policy’s economic impact was uncertain because it
had both pro- and anticompetitive justifications.76 In some instances, for example,
minimum resale price maintenance may give consumers more options by
stimulating interbrand competition.77 Alternatively, illegal monopolies could use
resale price maintenance to control price.78 Since both positive and negative
outcomes were possible, the Court held that per se liability was inappropriate for
analyzing vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements.79
Actions receiving per se condemnation include a variety of agreements between
competitors.80 For example, horizontal agreements between competitors to fix
prices, share profits, or divide territory are per se illegal.81 The Court determined
that these arrangements “reduce[] [the] incentives to compete” and thereby harm
competition.82 These bright line classifications help to reduce litigation expenses and
provide certainty for the legality of business practices.83 If the per se rule does not
apply then, depending on circumstances, a court will apply either the rule of reason
or “quick look” analysis.84
2. The Rule of Reason
Under Sherman Act § 1, the rule of reason is the default standard of review for
analyzing the legality of a challenged business practice.85 A court will apply the rule
of reason to every restraint of trade that does not qualify for “quick look” or per se
treatment.86 To prove that the defendant violated § 1 under this standard, a plaintiff
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 899.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 890 (citing Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1977)).
Id. at 892.
Id. at 899.
See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9 (identifying practices receiving per se treatment).
See Citizens Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133–35 (1969) (invalidating competing
newspapers’ fifty year contract to, inter alia, fix prices and refrain from engaging in competition); HOLMES &
MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9.
82. Citizens Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 135 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 328
(1904)).
83. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (noting that the Supreme
Court has tolerated invalidating some agreements that may otherwise prove reasonable to promote business
certainty and litigation efficiency).
84. See infra notes 85–118 and accompanying text.
85. Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (citing State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10–19 (1997)) (noting
that the Court presumptively applies the rule of reason analysis).
86. Id.
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must “demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable
and anticompetitive.”87 As an initial matter, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant had market power: the ability to raise prevailing market prices and
decrease total market output.88 For the court to assess market power, the plaintiff
must delineate the relevant market.89 A given product or service’s relevant market is
defined in terms of both available alternatives and geographic region of
competition.90 With the relevant market delineated, the finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice unreasonably harms competition, taking into
account a variety of factors.91
The result is a general inquiry into whether, under all the circumstances, the
challenged practice “impos[es] an unreasonable restraint on competition.”92 Courts
differ on the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of the analysis.93 Some courts require
actual proof of anticompetitive effects, such as above-market prices or decreased
output, while others require a showing of substantial risk of anticompetitive effects
in light of the circumstances.94 To determine if a plaintiff met the required standard,
courts consider the relevant conditions, including: the defendants’ intents and
purposes, the structure of and competitive conditions within the affected market,
the relative competitive positions and market power of the defendants, the presence
of economic or legal barriers inhibiting the ability of actual or potential competitors
to respond and offset the challenged practice, and apparent justifications for the
restrictions such as enhanced efficiencies.95 Given the complexities of the inquiry,

87. Id. The fact-intensive inquiry necessitates presentation of complex economic expert testimony in most
cases. For a discussion of the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved in the presentation
of economic expert testimony. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 67.
88. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.”).
92. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
93. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]he finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors,
including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” (citations omitted)).
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antitrust litigation subject to the rule of reason is a costly endeavor.96 To address
these concerns, federal courts have developed an intermediate standard of review.97
3. The Truncated or “Quick Look” Rule of Reason
In certain circumstances, a court will apply an abbreviated rule of reason.98 The
truncated rule of reason analysis, or “quick look,” is an intermediate line of
reasoning, which employs a burden-shifting framework predicated on a
presumption of illegality.99 Under the truncated rule, “a certain class of restraints . . .
may require no more than cursory examination to establish that their principal or
only effect is anticompetitive.”100 Once the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case,
courts apply a rebuttable presumption of illegality to the challenged constraint.101
The burden then shifts to the defendant who can rebut the presumption by proving
the act’s procompetitive nature.102 The truncated rule simplifies the extensive
market analysis typically required, eliminating the plaintiff’s need to delineate the
relevant market and show market power.103
A court applies the truncated rule when “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”104 The Supreme
Court used the truncated approach in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma105 when the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
challenged the legality of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA)
television broadcasting plan.106 Essentially, the NCAA limited the total number of
televised intercollegiate football games that any one team could broadcast.107 The
Court acknowledged that “by restraining the quantity of television rights available
for sale, the [NCAA’s plan] create[d] a limitation on output.”108 Although the plan
likely had anticompetitive effects on the market, limiting output and increasing
price, the Court considered the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications because
college athletics, by their very nature, require some restraints on competition.109
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Gladieux, supra note 30, at 471–72.
See infra notes 98–118 and accompanying text.
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10.
Id.
Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1911a, at 295–96 (2d ed. 2005)).
101. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
105. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
106. Id. at 88.
107. Id. at 94.
108. Id. at 99.
109. Id. at 101.
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Inter alia, the NCAA argued that the plan was necessary to protect live attendance
and maintain a competitive balance among amateur athletics.110 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court rejected each procompetitive justification, determining that the
plan restricted output because it prevented schools from responding to consumer
preference.111
If, however, an agreement’s anticompetitive effects are not immediately obvious
and it might plausibly have a net procompetitive effect or possibly no effect at all,
the “quick look” form of analysis is inappropriate.112 In California Dental Ass’n v.
FTC,113 the Supreme Court held that truncated analysis was inappropriate for
analyzing a dental association’s ethics rules that prevented member dentists from
advertising quality or offering discounts.114 Unlike NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, the Court could not easily ascertain the advertising
limitations’ competitive effects.115 The Court reasoned that the rules may enhance
competition by protecting uniformed customers from deceptive or confusing
advertising claims.116 As a result, the Court required full development of the record
to ensure that the impact of the rules was properly understood.117 A defendant,
however, may avoid the complexities of antitrust litigation if she can convince a
court that the challenged practice is exempt from review.118
B. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
In 1935, Congress signed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protects
unionization and employees’ exercise of collective bargaining rights.119 The NLRA
created the National Labor Relations Board to enforce employee rights, protect
employees’ right to organize, and obligate employers to bargain collectively with
unions.120 Because employee collective action could be perceived as an illegal
restraint of trade, Congress passed legislation establishing that unions do not
constitute combinations or conspiracies under the Sherman Act.121 Effectively,
Congress exempted certain union activities from antitrust review.122
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 115, 17.
Id. at 120.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).
526 U.S. 756 (1999).
Id. at 781.
Id. at 770–71.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 778.
See infra Part II.B.
In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRA under the Commerce Clause. National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
120. The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935passage-wagner-act (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
121. Three sources account for the statutory labor exemption: Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17,
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52, and Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuarda Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. See,
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Congress, however, failed to expressly exempt employers engaged in the
collective bargaining process from antitrust scrutiny.123 To fill this gap, the Supreme
Court read an implicit exemption into the labor exemption statutes to shield some
potentially competition-suppressing agreements between employers and unions
engaged in collective bargaining from antitrust review.124 The Supreme Court
created the exemption because “some restraints on competition imposed through
the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions” to further federal
labor policy and to promote meaningful collective bargaining.125 Courts have
applied the nonstatutory labor exemption to promote “good-faith bargaining over
wages, hours, and working conditions.”126
Although the boundaries of the nonstatutory labor exemption are unclear,
courts attempt to protect only those agreements that facilitate a competitive and fair
bargaining process.127 In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,128 the Supreme Court declined to apply the
nonstatutory labor exemption to agreements between labor and management
attempting to monopolize the electrical equipment manufacturing business in New
York City.129 The Supreme Court’s decision reflected Congress’s intent to prevent
unions from gaining, “complete and unreviewable authority to aid business groups
to frustrate [antitrust law’s] primary objective.”130 In addition, the Court declined to
insulate a wage agreement between mineworkers and large coal companies that the
Court saw as an attempt to eliminate competition.131 In these decisions, the Court

e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (“The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, . . .
organizations instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations . . . be held . . . to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (exempting labor organization from antitrust scrutiny).
123. See Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975) (noting that the explicit exemption does not include agreements between unions and nonlabor parties
(citing Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1962))).
124. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996) (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 237 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. at 622; Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711 (1965);
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665 (parentheticals omitted)); see also The Supreme Court —Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 327, 327 (1996) (“Courts have long struggled to reconcile the federal antitrust laws, which prohibit
anticompetitive combinations, with the federal labor laws, which encourage the formation of unions,
multiemployer bargaining groups, and other competition-reducing collaborations.”).
126. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236 (citations omitted).
127. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that although the
Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption, the Court’s guidance has come
from cases where the employer and union attempted to eliminate a competitor from the market).
128. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
129. Id. at 809.
130. Id. at 810.
131. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665–66 (1965).
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refused to protect collective bargaining agreements that failed to embody good-faith
bargaining efforts.132
Despite hesitation by lower courts,133 the Supreme Court broadened the
nonstatutory labor exemption to include agreements solely between employers.134 In
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme Court insulated the National Football
League’s (NFL) unilateral implementation of the developmental squad program
despite resistance from the National Football League Players Association.135 The
Court relied on five factors to resolve the issue: (1) whether the action “grew out of,
and was directly related to” the collective bargaining process, (2) whether the
practice was “unobjectionable as a matter of labor law and policy,” (3) whether it
concerned only parties to the collective bargaining relationship, (4) whether the
conduct involved subject matter that the parties were required to negotiate
collectively, and (5) whether the conduct “took place during and immediately after
a collective-bargaining negotiation.”136 In holding that the nonstatutory labor
exemption applied, the Court emphasized that, for the exemption to be effective, it
must apply to both the completed agreement and the bargaining process.137
Moreover, the Court stressed that some restraints on competition were necessary to
protect meaningful collective bargaining.138 By expanding the nonstatutory labor
exemption in Brown, the Court showed a willingness to exempt employer-only
agreements provided they facilitate a competitive and healthy bargaining process.139

III. The Court’s Reasoning
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the
nonstatutory labor exemption, holding that the RSP was not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny.140 The court strictly interpreted Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., reasoning that,
under the totality of the circumstances, the logic and history of the exemption
counseled against applying the nonstatutory labor exemption to the grocers’ RSP.141

132.
133.

See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 257b2, at 141 (3d ed. 2006) (noting
that the courts have been historically reluctant to extend the exemption to an agreement between employers
that did not include an employee group).
134. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
135. The NFL sought to create developmental squads, whose players would be paid $1000 per week. Id. at
234. The developmental squad players filed suit arguing the NFL had made an agreement in restraint of trade
violating § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 235.
136. Id. at 238, 250.
137. See id. at 243 (“One cannot mean the principle literally—that the exemption applies only to
understandings embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement—for the collective-bargaining process may take
place before the making of any agreement or after an agreement has expired.”).
138. Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
139. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
140. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011).
141. Id.
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First, the Ninth Circuit contrasted the unilateral imposition of terms by the NFL
in Brown with the MEBU’s use of the RSP.142 The court noted that the former was an
accepted and extensively regulated practice in labor negotiation, whereas in the
present case the defendants’ actions lacked the necessary history or endorsement
from labor law and policy.143 Since the parties were unable to identify regulatory or
judicial decisions that sanctioned the use of a RSP as an economic weapon during a
labor dispute, the court reasoned that the RSP was “on different footing” than the
agreement in Brown.144
The court then concluded that the concerns “central to the history and logic of
the exemption” underlying Brown were not present.145 The court reasoned that the
RSP was neither significant nor necessary to the collective bargaining process
because it did not relate to any core subject matter of bargaining.146 According to the
court, the defendants’ assertion of the RSP’s relative value and purpose as an
economic weapon over a core bargaining subject was insufficient to merit the
implicit exemption’s application.147 The court went further, arguing that exempting
the RSP would allow multiemployer bargaining units to fix prices while claiming it
was simply an economic bargaining tool.148 The court, however, did not read Brown
to expand the nonstatutory exemption so broadly.149
To support its decision, the court maintained that failure to expand the
nonstatutory labor exemption would not “introduce instability and uncertainty
into the collective bargaining process.”150 According to the Ninth Circuit, the fear of
antitrust liability would not hinder the functioning of the collective bargaining
process.151 Furthermore, the RSP did not concern the labor market.152 Since the RSP
only concerned the “business market,” the case for exemption applicability was not
strong.153 The court argued that the grocers’ profit-sharing was not directly
consequential to the labor market.154

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1129–30.
The core subject matter of bargaining includes wages, hours, and working conditions. Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 242(1996)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (“The case for the applicability of the non-statutory exemption is strongest where the alleged
restraint operates primarily in the labor market and has only tangential effects on the business market.”
(quoting Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental &
Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008))).
154. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1131. The court stopped short of “endorsing the concept that as a strict rule the
non-statutory labor exemption can only arise in a case involving restraint of terms directly relating to labor.” Id.
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Finally, the court reasoned that the MEBU’s inclusion of a nonmember in the
revenue sharing scheme “counsel[ed] against application of the exemption.”155
Because the actions in Brown concerned only parties to the collective bargaining
process, the court was uncomfortable stretching the nonstatutory labor exemption
to an agreement including nonmembers.156 The inclusion of Food 4 Less, a
nonbargaining grocer, was evidence that the defendants’ actions were not tethered
to the collective bargaining process.157 The defendants failed to convince the court
that the nonmember’s inclusion in the RSP was necessary because Food 4 Less’s
future negotiations depended on the current dispute’s outcome.158 Thus, the court
held that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply.159
In dissent, Chief Judge Kozinski criticized the majority’s decision as beyond the
scope of the court’s Article III jurisdiction.160 Since no antitrust liability could be
established, Chief Judge Kozinski maintained, the court’s ruling on the
nonstatutory labor exemption was unnecessary.161 The Chief Judge argued that
California’s stipulated dismissal upon a finding that rule of reason applies made it
unlikely that the defendant would appeal the decision.162 Thus, the court had
effectively insulated the ruling from appellate scrutiny.163
Moreover, the Chief Judge argued that the majority incorrectly decided the issue
by failing to grapple with the complexities of the case.164 Chief Judge Kozinski
contended that every factor the Supreme Court found relevant in Brown supported
finding the RSP protected by the labor exemption.165 The dissent argued the first
factor was satisfied; the RSP was inextricably intertwined with the collective
bargaining process.166 Moreover, the Supreme Court and NLRB have generally
sanctioned the use of economic weapons to combat whipsaw tactics.167 Thus, the
RSP met the second Brown factor: the conduct was “unobjectionable as a matter of
labor law and policy.”168 Third, the RSP concerned only parties with a direct stake in
the outcome of the dispute.169 Because Food 4 Less was bound to negotiate with the
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d
1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. (“The grocers’ agreement was a direct response to the union’s anticipated use of whipsaw
tactics.”).
167. Id. at 1141 (citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965)).
168. Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238 (1996)).
169. Id. at 1142 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 250).
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union, it had a strong interest in the current negotiations.170 The fourth Brown
factor — whether the conduct involved subject matter that the parties were
required to negotiate collectively — did not apply because the RSP was procedural,
not substantive, in nature, the dissent argued.171 Finally, the conduct took place
during and immediately after the collective bargaining negotiations because of the
RSP’s inherently limited duration.172 Thus, the MEBU’s actions met the Brown
standard for application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.173
On the issue of the appropriate antitrust standard of review, however, the
majority pivoted its approach, holding that rule of reason analysis applied to the
RSP.174 The court rejected California’s argument that the RSP should be per se illegal
as either a profit-pooling agreement or a market-allocation agreement.175 The court
distinguished the RSP from a profit-pooling agreement based on the RSP’s shortterm, temporary nature.176 Furthermore, since the RSP excluded some grocers
operating in the region, it did not constitute a profit-pooling arrangement.177
Finally, the court argued that the RSP was also not an illegal market-allocation
agreement because it did not prevent any defendant from making sales, stop grocers
from selling any particular products, or limit the grocers to a particular set of
customers or geographic regions.178 Given these factors, the court reasoned that the
RSP did not “facially appear[] to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output,” making application of the per se rule
inappropriate.179
The court also rejected the application of “quick look” analysis because the RSP’s
characteristics made its anticompetitive effects uncertain.180 The RSP’s limited
duration and significant external competition in the market made it impossible for
the court to determine the RSP’s true economic impact on a “quick look.”181 The
court argued that a full record must be developed to understand the actual RSP’s

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. Food 4 Less was required to pay employee benefits at a rate tied to that of Ralphs. Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id. (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 250)
Id. In a separate dissent, Judge Reinhardt, who authored the original Ninth Circuit decision, argued
that under “quick look” analysis, the RSP should have been found to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
1144–45 (Reinhart, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1139 (majority opinion).
175. Id. at 1134.
176. See id. at 1136 (citing Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)) (noting that
because only some competitors in the relevant market were a party to the agreement, and because the RSP was
of limited duration, the challenged constraint does not fit any “easy label” that can be considered a per se
violation of the Sherman Act).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1137.
179. Id. (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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economic impact.182 The unique features strongly suggested that the agreement
“might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no
effect at all on competition.”183 Given the inapplicability of the per se rule and
truncated rule of reason, the presumptive rule of reason was the appropriate
standard of review.184

IV. Analysis
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the
nonstatutory labor exemption to the challenged RSP; consequently, multiemployer
bargaining units face antitrust liability if they employ a temporary revenue sharing
provision to counter union whipsaw tactics.185 In addition, the court’s narrow
holding attached the rule of reason standard of review to temporary revenue
sharing provisions.186 The decision reflects federal courts’ continued shift from
formalistic line drawing to the rule of reason for assessing antitrust claims.187
Although the court correctly linked the rule of reason to the complex economic
nature of the challenged constraint, it unnecessarily limited the nonstatutory labor
exemption’s scope.188 The court’s restrictive reading grants unions a competitive
advantage during collective bargaining, undermining the federal government’s
policy to encourage fair negotiations.189 The Supreme Court should overturn the
Ninth Circuit and shield temporary revenue sharing provisions between
multiemployer bargaining units to further federal labor law’s policy promoting
equitable labor relations.190
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Rule of Reason Continues the Federal Courts’
Jurisprudential Shift Away from Formalistic Line Drawing, Protecting Complex
Business Practices from Premature Condemnation Under the Sherman Act
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit properly rejected
summary condemnation of the defendants’ RSP through either “quick look” or per
se analysis.191 The court’s adherence to the rule of reason continues federal courts’

182. See id. (“One might want to have an understanding of the market impact of other competitors . . . an
understanding whether other competitors were waiting in the wings to exploit any anticompetitive market by
their entry . . . .”).
183. Id. at 1138 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)).
184. Id. at 1139.
185. Id. at 1134–35.
186. Id. at 1139.
187. See infra, Part V.A.
188. See infra, Part V.B.
189. See infra, Part V.B.
190. See infra, Part V.B.
191. 651 F.3d at 1139.
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emphasis on minimizing the use of bright line standards in antitrust litigation.192 In
future antitrust challenges to complex bargaining tactics, applying the rule of reason
standard will help further the federal antitrust policy of condemning only
unreasonable restraints of trade, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and
avoiding false positives.193
The court properly ruled on the issue of whether the per se or “quick look” rules
applied to the RSP because it placed the provision in the appropriate context.194 The
unique circumstances surrounding the RSP — its limited duration and the
existence of other competitors in the market — suggest that a court cannot
determine the agreement to be “anticompetitive on its face.”195 In other words,
internal and external factors minimize the risk of anticompetitive effects.196 With
other competitors in the market, appropriate incentives remained to prevent the
firms from taking anticompetitive action.197 In addition, given the agreement’s
temporary nature, the individual firms within the MEBU are motivated to keep
prices at competitive levels during and after collective bargaining.198 As a result, the
internal and external competition would mitigate the MEBU’s ability to raise prices
or reduce output, preventing anticompetitive outcomes.199
Since the Supreme Court has stressed the need to avoid false positives and
embraced economic modeling to analyze challenged practices, defaulting to the rule
of reason is necessary to ensure that trial courts effectuate those policies.200 Full
development of the record through rule of reason analysis will reduce the
occurrence of false positives.201 By avoiding formalistic rules, federal courts can
adequately assess the actual competitive effect of a challenged business practice.202 In
turn, fewer beneficial practices will be condemned.203 In the instant case, the RSP’s

192. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (holding that rule of reason
analysis applies to vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling the per se illegality of vertical territorial restraints in favor of the rule of reason).
193. See infra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.
194. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Danger of Rudimentary Economics: ‘Safeway’ Competitive Effects
Analysis, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/
Publications2498_0.pdf (noting that judges’ risk presuming that a practice is anticompetitive when they fail to
analyze the context of the restraint).
195. See id. (criticizing Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion for failing to consider critical aspects of the
RSP, including its effects and temporal limitation).
196. Id.
197. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011).
198. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194 (“The temporal limitation, however, is critical to the entire inquiry
as it discourages the parties from functioning as a cartel.”).
199. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.
200. See Bernard, supra note 57, at 591.
201. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.
202. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.
203. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.
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unique circumstances indicate a plausibility of neutral or procompetitive effects.204
If the RSP allowed the grocers to withstand union pressure, preventing abovemarket labor costs, consumers would benefit from the corresponding lower
prices.205 Without all the facts on the record, the court could not adequately assess
the RSP’s impact.206 Since the RSP’s economic impact is uncertain, imposing
liability based on a limited record would increase the risk of “mistaken inferences”
by the judge.207 Instead, by applying rule of reason analysis, litigants can establish an
appropriate foundation, allowing courts to fully comprehend the challenged
agreement’s impact on consumer welfare.208
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Improper Application of the Brown Factors to the Grocers’ RSP
Unnecessarily Limits the Scope of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, Giving Unions a
Competitive Advantage During Collective Bargaining
Though the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the rule of reason applies to the RSP,
the court misapplied the Brown factors and consequently failed to insulate the RSP
from antitrust scrutiny.209 As a result, the decision unnecessarily limits the scope of
the nonstatutory labor exemption and gives unions a competitive advantage during
collective bargaining.210 The threat of antitrust liability will discourage employers
from using revenue sharing provisions during labor negotiations.211 Alternatively,
the nonstatutory labor exemption, if applied, would further equitable collective
bargaining by protecting the integrity of multiemployer bargaining units.212
The Ninth Circuit errantly constrained the nonstatutory labor exemption by
misapplying the Supreme Court precedent in Brown.213 The Brown factors and the
decision’s underlying concerns are satisfied by the defendants’ RSP.214 First, the
provision was “inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining process.”215
The RSP, lasting for a limited period, was intended to mitigate the union’s whipsaw

204. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)).
205. See John A. Litwinski, Regulation of Labor Market Monopsony, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 58–59
(2001).
206. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.
207. See Bernard, supra note 57, at 591.
208. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
209. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
210. See id. (noting that “the unions would . . . upset the prevailing competitive balance, crippling the target
and ruining any chance of bargaining as a group”).
211. Id. at 1144.
212. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194 (noting that “whipsaw tactics are intended to force an employer to
settle early or split from an MEBU by harming that employer to the benefit of its competitors”).
213. See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority incorrectly decided the
issue because it “fail[ed] to grapple with the complex dynamics of th[e] case”).
214. Id. at 1140–44.
215. Id. at 1140 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996)).
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tactic.216 The provision, therefore, was directly related to the negotiations.217 Second,
both the Supreme Court and National Labor Relations Board have previously
sanctioned the use of economic weapons to combat whipsaw tactics.218 Since the
RSP was designed to maintain group cohesion during collective bargaining, it
promoted healthy negotiations.219 Thus, the RSP provided balance and was
“unobjectionable as a matter of labor law and policy.”220 Third, the RSP concerned
only parties with a direct stake in the outcome of the collective bargaining
agreement.221 Although Food 4 Less had a separate union contract, its agreement
expired the following month.222 As a practical matter, the current dispute’s outcome
would determine the nonmember’s new contract terms.223 The fourth Brown factor
— whether the conduct involved subject matter that the parties were required to
negotiate collectively — was irrelevant.224 In Harris, unlike in Brown, the challenged
practice was a procedural bargaining tactic rather than a substantive contract
term.225 Therefore, asking whether the practice related to “wages, hours, and
working conditions” is unnecessary.226 Finally, the conduct occurred during and
immediately after negotiations due to the RSP’s temporal limitation.227 Thus, the
majority rested its decision on an improper application of the Brown factors,
undermining federal labor policy.228
As a matter of policy, the federal judiciary should expand the nonstatutory labor
exemption to include temporary revenue sharing provisions designed to maintain
group cohesion during labor disputes.229 Liberal application of the exemption would
protect balanced negotiations between employer and union during collective
bargaining.230 Without the implicit exemption, the court limits a bargaining unit’s
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141 (citing NLRB v. Brown, 38 U.S. 278 (1965)).
Id.
Brown, 518 U.S. at 238.
See Harris, 651 F.3d, at 1142 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 250).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 250).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 215–27.
See supra notes 230–39 and accompanying text.
See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[W]hipsaw tactics are particularly devastating
for employers, because ‘the union strikes against one member of a multiemployer bargaining unit, but allows
the other employers to continue operating in order to maximize the competitive pressure brought to bear upon
the struck member . . . ; the idea is thereby to force each employer individually to capitulate through a series of
such strikes, thus defeating their attempting to stand together.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. Of Boilermakers v. NLRB,
858 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1988))). Previously, courts had upheld revenue sharing provisions, reducing the
need for further antitrust scrutiny. See Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1963)
(upholding the use of a strike insurance plan where both struck and non-struck railroads paid into a fund that
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ability to effectively combat whipsaw tactics.231 Selective picketing erodes group
unity because of the targeted financial pressure.232 The lone firm’s incentives change
as pressure to settle or leave the group increases.233 Because a multiemployer
bargaining unit’s temporary revenue sharing provision is not insulated from
antitrust scrutiny, the potential liability increases the employers’ costs of combating
whipsaw tactics.234 Since the threat of antitrust liability remains, the Ninth Circuit
has created an imbalance of power favoring labor unions.235
The competitive imbalance will encourage unions to increase use of whipsaw
tactics and threaten antitrust litigation, possibly affecting the outcome of
negotiations and reducing equitable collective bargaining.236 The court’s holding
increases labor costs, placing pressure on employers’ profit margins, and ultimately
raises prices for consumers.237 Maintaining a balance of power during collective
bargaining, however, would promote meaningful negotiations between employer
and union and ensure that fair labor contracts are produced.238 To do otherwise
would undermine the “national policy . . . of promoting ‘the peaceful settlement of
industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory
influence of negotiation.’”239

Conclusion
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s decision mismanages
the intersection of antitrust and labor law.240 Although, the decision correctly
followed federal courts’ preference for avoiding false positives over economical
litigation, the nonstatutory labor exemption provided a superior path for resolving

supported struck railroads); Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 502 F.2d 453, 458 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (upholding a “Mutual Aid Pact” in which any struck bound members received payment from the other
members equal to their increase in revenues resulting from the strike).
231. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1143–44 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
232. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194 (noting that “whipsaw tactics are intended to force an employer to
settle early or split from an MEBU by harming that employer to the benefit of its competitors”).
233. Id.
234. See supra note 30.
235. See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that without the revenue sharing
provision unions “would thereby upset the prevailing competitive balance, crippling the target and ruining any
chance of bargaining as a group”).
236. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237. See Litwinski, supra note 205, at 58–59 (noting that, in competitive markets, unions obtain wages
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240. See supra Parts IV.A–B.
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the dispute.241 The Harris court’s narrow interpretation of the nonstatutory labor
exemption created an imbalance of power between employer and union.242 Failure
to insulate efficiency-increasing negotiation practices will undermine equitable
negotiations, raising costs for consumers.243 Because of the case’s small likelihood of
appeal, congressional action or alternative litigation is necessary to correct the
persisting imbalance.244

241.
242.
243.
244.
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See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 162–63.
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